not need be overt at the outset, but it is essential that the gap be bridged with a broad front of liberation which embodies the general interest of society without causing a majority class which is capable of carrying through the task. Thirty Revolutionary War. If this support is not implicit in their project, the guerrillas will inevitably lose the war strategically, despite any conventional military victories, because they will not be able to mobilize all the population.

To amplify his position, Guillian develops the following dichotomy between the practice of rebels and of revolutionaries:

"The voluntaristic idealism of rebels, not to be confused with the political sagacity, dialectical objectives and strategy of revolutionaries, requires not only the victory for reality; it subjectivizes ferendent revolutionary desires without taking into account objective revolutionary conditions. Rebel action without thinking mat
ters out; the revolutionary takes a leap. By following a dialectic of economic analysis of the situation, a study of the fronts of the struggle, and an effort to avoid becoming isolated in war through a liberation directed against the principle enemy, the oligarchy, the rebels seek a democratic participation in the revolution which is not an organization as the basis for the armed vanguard, from a clear and sensible program that unites the oppressed classes against the oppressor-explorers, from a strategy and tactics compelling the revolutionary to fight a surface rather than a linear war, i.e. to mobilize the dispersed forces towards its strategic goal."

In total, Guillian views guerrilla warfare as a pragmatic political struggle by a revolutionary force against an oppressive military coalition in which a revolutionary population coexists with the authoritarian infrastructure of the State, initiating and expanding the Socialist Revolution.

Revolutionary Praxis

While he was systematizing his concept of the relationship between urban guerrilla theory and strategy in Latin America, Guillian engaged in extensive dialogues and participative discussions with the founders of the Tupamaros Liberation Movement of Uruguay. These discussions led to the Tupamaros' "closed-door" preparatory meetings and to their initial guerrilla raid in July 1963 and finally to their surrender. Guillian regarded the armed encounter with the police in December, 1966. Guillian's influence can be seen in the creation of widespread dissatisfaction. The Tupamaros also failed to form the "broad front" of oppressed classes advocated by Guillian. The Tupamaros felt that the "broad front" would be forged in the heat of a protracted armed struggle. As for the necessary economic crisis, the Tupamaros' analysis correctly predicted that Uruguay was soon heading into an prolonged economic degradation. The existence of bourgeois democracy in Uruguay they regarded as a relative factor which was subject to the whims of the oligar

my. In spite of their imperiousness on these important matters the Tupamaros took to heart much of Guillian's advice about the revolutionary minorities. Of special significance was the Tupamaros' adherence to Guillian's proposition that the revolutionary minority must be based on a movement that cannot be classified in terms of the classical political labels, but rather one that takes a date as the origin of its political denunciation and revolutionary action..."